Tag: Melbourne

  • Round 22, 2025

    Round 22, 2025

    This Week In Football is a collection of some of the best in football currently outside the walls of AFL clubs or broadcasters. Each week a curated grab bag from regular contributors and special guests will provide insight into and beyond the game on subjects of their choosing. For more about our contributors, click here.

    Banner images by Polly Porridge of the True Bloods Podcast. Check out her other design work.

    Before the Bounce

    Every year football tends to enter a slight hibernation period in the middle of winter before awaking anew as spring slowly starts to poke its head around.

    With just four weeks left the season is very much alive, with some of the finest games of the season being fought out by finalists (think Collingwood v Fremantle) and non-finalists (St Kilda v Melbourne) alike.

    The race is on for most spots that matter – from the minor premier to the last finals spot. While there’s a couple of win break to tenth and eleventh on the ladder, sides right through to 14th have shown at least moments of brilliance.

    But some have claimed that the season has been dull, ignoring much that we’ve observed on the field. Despite renewal at the top end of the ladder and a fair amount of tumult as the season has progressed, there hasn’t been enough for everyone.

    Perhpas some of this is down to the lower number of truly close games than the last couple of seasons. Average game margins are up 2.5 points per game on last season. In addition, the number of games decided by less than a straight kick is down to 10% from last year’s 19%.

    But it’s worth noting how unusually close the past four seasons have been. Normal can sometimes be skewed by the extraordinary. And while there are fewer games that are extremely close, there are more than normal that are very close.

    And things only seem to be getting tighter week on week.

    As a famous philosopher once said: strap yourselves in.

    This week in football we have:


    Breaking Down Brisbane vs Collingwood

    James Ives

    It started with a deep intercept mark in defensive 50 by Harris Andrews, followed by six quick-release kicks to uncontested marks as Brisbane sliced through the corridor. Callum Ah Chee then found space inside 50, setting up Logan Morris to assist one of Henry Smith’s three goals.

    It was a stark contrast to the Easter Thursday match-up at the Gabba, where Collingwood’s defensive dark arts were on full display. They forced Brisbane wide at every opportunity and preyed on the umpires’ tightening of the 15m rule. Brisbane struggled to adapt to Collingwood’s aggressive front-half press and often found themselves caught in-between lengthening the ground and providing overloads on the 45s, making them vulnerable in transition when they turned the ball over. 

    This dichotomy in performances can be attributed to combination of factors; greater scrutiny of the stand rule; greater leniency of the 15m rule; Collingwood’s lack of speed in the front half, missing McCreery and Hill (sub); Brisbane making offensive adjustments to stay more connected to their deepest forwards; and finally, the MCG factor. 

    The last point is somewhat provocative and counterintuitive. How can a team based in Brisbane be better suited to the MCG than the primary occupants in Collingwood. Part of the answer lies in Brisbane’s style. At the beginning of 2024, they doubled down on their kick-mark approach, leading the league with 110 marks per game. They entered the Grand Final of 2023 winning only one of their last 11 games at the home of footy (which was the previous week’s preliminary final against Melbourne). Since the Grand Final loss, they’ve won six out of seven, turning the MCG into somewhat of a mini fortress. 

    The MCG provides Brisbane with the extra width and length to maximise the benefits of their control game. Give them too much space and they’ll pick you apart.  Over-correct and they’ll just play around you.

    Look at the video below, which analyses two plays that highlight the differences between Brisbane’s approach in round 6 at the Gabba and round 21 at the MCG. 

    To further emphasise the point, take a look Brisbane’s kick map across both games. In Round 6, Brisbane often got caught on the flanks, happily taking what Collingwood were willing to give up. Their profile looks like a two-hour session of circle work. 

    In contrast, round 21 looked a lot more like the Brisbane of 2024. Changing angles, attacking the corridor, using the full width and length of the ground, quick release kicks and still undefeated on the MCG.

    Maybe I’m wrong and guilty of being a resultist. Maybe I’m right, and Collingwood delivers another beatdown at the Gabba. Or maybe we’ll have to wait until Grand Final Day to find out.


    Luke Beveridge, enigma of the West

    Jack Turner | The Back Pocket | TheBackPocketAU

    As a player, Luke Beveridge never really planted his flag successfully.

    Beveridge played 118 games across three clubs (Melbourne, Footscray and St Kilda) without reaching the half century at any of them. No real personal accolades aside from making the Greek Team of the Century, almost purely to make up the numbers.

    His rise as a coach followed a less traditional pathway also. He didn’t move from playing into the assistant coaches box or try his hand coaching in the VFL, SANFL or WAFL. Instead, he went back to dig his heels in at grass roots level coaching St Bede’s Mentone in the VAFA. 

    When Beveridge arrived at St Bedes, they were competing in the C Division. His now-trademark style of emotional buy-in, and building a theme around the season took the Mentone Tigers to the Division C premiership in 2006, the Division B premiership in 2007, and ultimately on to the Division A premiership in 2008. If we paid as much attention to our amateur or semi-professional leagues in Australia as they do in some other sports, this would be the stuff of folklore.

    It became obvious to those paying attention that he had a knack for coaching, and was quickly snapped up by Collingwood’s AFL program alongside legendary coach Mick Malthouse, and was a part of the coaching panel that led the Magpies to their droughtbreaking 2010 premiership. St Bedes Meltone have still not won a premiership in any division since 2008.

    Beveridge then took a break in 2011 – a year that an “unbeatable” Collingwood side couldn’t get the job done against Geelong three times – before returning to assistant coaching at the top level, this time under Alastair Clarkson at Hawthorn, helping oversee the first two of the now famous threepeat, before a coaching spot opened up at the Western Bulldogs due to the retirement of Brendan McCartney. 

    When Beveridge took over at the Bulldogs, they were coming off of one of their worst three season runs in the modern era, with many tipping them to win the wooden spoon, due to just seven wins for the season and Adam Cooney and Ryan Griffin departing to Essendon and GWS respectively.

    Instead, the modern Docklands marvel that is Luke Beveridge impressed right from the get go, taking a plucky young Bulldogs side to a sixth-place finish. In just his second season, Luke Beveridge famously won a flag for the Western Bulldogs, something his predecessors had failed to do for 62 years prior.

    Since then the Bulldogs have continued to be thereabouts, but never quite finished the job. Even in 2016 they flew home from 7th to win the flag, and nearly did the same in 2021. One thing he does have over many other coaches who get scrutinised for getting the job mostly done but never completely is that he did win that first flag.

    The intangible that we have to consider when it comes to Luke Beveridge is the strange and nigh unexplainable Docklands effect. No Docklands tenant has made the Top 4 since 2009, and the Bulldogs are the only Docklands tenant to win a premiership since its first year of operation when Essendon had their famous 2000 season run and resulting premiership.

    This weird and near incomprehensible Docklands statistic makes it difficult to judge Luke Beveridge’s tenure when compared to other coaches. Against coaches who have lined up against him on multiple occasions, only five have a positive win-loss ratio, a further five have broken even at 50-50, and twenty-two have lost more than they have won against Beveridge’s Bulldogs.

    Another common criticism of Beveridge is his willingness to throw the magnets around and play players seemingly out of position. A phenomenon that has come to be known in footy circles as “Crazy Bevo”. But for any of the failings of Crazy Bevo’s magnet switches, there are just as many – if not more – success stories.

    Rory Lobb has been a revelation in the backline, Ed Richards was being touted as a Brownlow fancy a mere month ago after being moved from the backline to the midfield. Aaron Naughton and Sam Darcy were both seen as key defenders in their first seasons and yet the two look set to combine for over 100 goals this year.

    Outside of positional switches, there was outcry and mockery at the fact Beveridge didn’t have Daniel or Macrae in his best 22, especially once they were traded and were looking to have an impact at their new clubs early this year. In their stead has come the clear reason why. Freijah has been a clear upgrade on Daniel and Kennedy on Macrae, as the shunned two sat on the bench at their respective new clubs for much of the final terms in Round 20.

    The Western Bulldogs haven’t lost a game by more than ten goals since the 2021 Grand Final. No other team has a streak that extends back further than the start of 2024, with only seven teams – Bulldogs included – having not lost by ten or more goals this season. In fact the Bulldogs haven’t even lost a game by 50+ since their back to back 50 point losses to start off 2023 – a year they still almost stormed home to make finals.

    For all the talk of the miraculous list that the Bulldogs possess, people fail to look past the stars and into the role players. The team that just last week dismantled an in-form GWS side to the tune of 88 points included names like James O’Donnell, Oskar Baker, Lachlan McNeil, Caleb Poulter and Lachlan Bramble. At times this year, they have been joined by Nick Coffield, Ryan Gardner, James Harmes and Harvey Gallagher. This is meant as no disrespect to these players who have done a great job under Bevo’s guidance, but they are by no means walk up starts at any other club in the AFL.

    It is important to factor in many of these things when discussing both Luke Beveridge and the Western Bulldogs. It is easy to get caught up in their ceiling to floor ratio, and the games they have lost in recent years that they should have easily won, but when it is all laid out, Beveridge has one of the better modern coaching records, and remains the Bulldogs only AFL era premiership coach.

    Will Luke Beveridge’s Bulldogs side cause havoc in the finals series this year, and win another unlikely flag? It’s probably less likely than it is likely, but they boast two of the most unstoppable players in the league in Bontempelli and Darcy and nobody loves an underdog story more than Bevo. I don’t think many teams would be excited to face them in a last chance final.


    History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes

    Emlyn Breese / CreditToDuBois.com

    This is an excerpt from a longer piece published on CreditToDuBois

    Simon Goodwin’s tenure as coach can, more than any other, be defined by a rule. Fitting for the coach of the Demons that this rule would be 6-6-6.

    Round 1 2017 – Simon Goodwin’s first game as Melbourne Coach. The Demons take on Alan Richardson’s St Kilda. All time Saints great Nick Riewoldt kicks two goals in the first quarter continuing his long-running torment of Melbourne. The 6-6-6 rule isn’t even a gleam in Steve Hockings eye and Goodwin has up to 9 players starting in defence at times.

    This isn’t a flooding strategy though – as the ball bounces the spares move through the centre square to provide attacking options. It sees them win 10 consecutive centre clearances and helps turn the match with a run of 10 goals.

    Image: Fox Sports

    Four years later and as far away from a Round 1 twilight game at Docklands as you can get – the 2021 Grand Final in Perth. We turn to the middle of the match. Marcus Bontempelli has put his Bulldogs three goals up and Melbourne are on the ropes. A goal to Bayley Fritsch sees the margin closed and the ball returned to the centre. In less than a minute of game time the Demons rip the ball out of the middle and score a further two. Even more astoundingly, ten minutes later they do the same again, scoring three goals in the final minute of the quarter.

    The 6-6-6 rule means nowhere to hide and few ways for the Dogs to mitigate the damage. The result is the most astounding display of pure football since the peak of Geelong’s time under Mark Thompson, and possibly ever. Melbourne score 100 of the last 107 points of the match and Goodwin breaks the longest active premiership drought in the league.

    We move forward another four years, but like many stories we return to where it started. Docklands. Twilight time-slot. The opponents are once again St Kilda, although faces have changed or moved roles. Alan Richardson now plays confidant to Goodwin rather than competitor. Nick Riewoldt provides commentary as Nasiah Wanganeen-Milera anoints himself as the heir to St Nick in the St Kilda mythos with two last quarter goals.

    Like the Bulldogs four years prior, Melbourne finds their options limited in blunting a withering 9-goal onslaught. However, 6-6-6 still has an even more central role to play. Melbourne goes where few teams before have tread, and none with such dire consequences. They concede a free kick for a 6-6-6 infringement at the final centre bounce with scores tied. This leads to a Wanganeen-Milera mark and a goal after the siren to seal Goodwin’s fate.

    He would go on to coach the following week, and Brad Green denies the result played a part in his sacking, but it’s plain to see this is where Goodwin’s career at Melbourne was decided

    Throughout Goodwin’s coaching tenure his contribution to his game and club have continually and unfairly been diminished. Now is as good a time as any to look at his legacy.

    Taking the team to a preliminary final in 2018 was largely credited to the framework Paul Roos set up. Make no mistake though, this was light years away from anything Roos had coached.

    People finally gave Goodwin ownership of results when Melbourne finished in the bottom two the following year.

    The ultimate success of 2021 was attributed to hyperbolic assessment of Melbourne as one of the greatest playing lists ever assembled. Yet it was seen as Goodwin’s failing when those same players kicked themselves out of consecutive finals in 2023.

    Simon Goodwin took over from one of the more defensively-minded coaches of the modern era. Within two seasons he had forged the team into one of the most potent offences we’ve seen in a decade. He was then able to transform it once again into one of the greatest defensive sides in the game’s history. Most coaches don’t succeed in one style, yet Goodwin appears to be criticised more than anything else for not being able to guide a playing group through a third successful metamorphosis.


    Does a radically smaller ground change how AFLW games are played?

    Sean Lawson 

    A common take on social media is that AFL Women’s games would be better or higher scoring if played on a much smaller field. Presumably this notion is based on a perception that regular fields take too long to traverse for AFLW players’ kicking distances and running speeds.

    For people who believe in shrinking AFLW grounds, the first round of the AFLW presents a very special opportunity to watch some women’s footy under these very conditions.

    When Sydney host Richmond in their Round 1 clash at North Sydney Oval next Friday, viewers get to see the women’s game played on by far the smallest oval ever featured in either the AFLM or AFLW .

    North Sydney is uniquely small, and more distinct from other venues than anything else seen in the AFLM or AFLW. At 125 metres, it is a full 25 metres shorter than any other AFL ground in use in either league, and 35 metres shorter than the average ground.

    At 108 metres, it’s narrower than anything else except North Hobart Oval, though it’s relatively close to the narrowness of Norwood Oval’s width, a venue used in both the AFLW and AFLM.

    In terms of area, using the simple formula for an ellipse, North Sydney Oval at about 10,600m² is about 58% of the area of the largest ground (Cazalys in Cairns), and only about two thirds the area of a standard ground like Docklands. 

    For reference here is a sortable list of all the grounds being used in the AFLW this year and their dimensions:

    The centre squeeze

    So, how does the wildly small field at North Sydney impact footy? Most obviously, the shape of the centre square changes. A typical modern footy field features a 50 metre arc at each end and a 50 metre centre square, which obviously will not all fit here.

    Following the pre-2007 SCG strategy of arcs overlapping the square would look very odd here, and also create issues adjudicating the AFLW’s 5-6-5 centre bounce starting positions. 

    Instead, the solution devised is to squish the square end-to-end.This creates the opportunity for very unusual setups such as that employed by Chloe Molloy here:

    The truncated “square” means a starting forward like Molloy can get to the bounce well before the wings do, and even beat midfielders to the ball.

    Sydney don’t run this sort of approach as a full time measure, but here’s an example from 2023’s comeback win against GWS where Brooke Lochland comes in from the forward zone and gathers a hitout which on a full-sized field probably would have been collected by a midfielder:

    Tactical exploration of the centre rectangle has probably been limited by there only being one game per year at NSO. After round 1, the Swans move over to the vibes capital of the AFLW in Henson Park, while North Sydney Oval groundskeepers start developing a cricket pitch for Sixers WBBL games.

    As such, there’s only a modest benefit to spending very much time getting deep and creative on different centre bounce strategies which only work for the first week of the season.

    However, the very close arcs do remain available for centre bounce tactical switch ups, and are something to watch for from Sydney and Richmond at North Sydney Oval on Friday night.

    Footy’s dead space

    Does the tiny ground impact scoring? There’s only a small sample, but what we can say is is these games have not been especially high scoring so far:

    Teams have scored more at several much larger grounds, including the 2024 Swans v Richmond result game at Coffs Harbour. Coffs appears from footage and Google Maps measurements, to be a bit under 180 metres long, good for the longest venue in either league.

    A primary reason why NSO doesn’t see more scoring is probably that large parts of a footy ground are dead space at any given time. Most footy is played in an effective area quite a bit smaller than even the tiniest AFL fields. Here’s a shot from last season’s game at North Sydney Oval, ahead of a throw-in at the forward pocket:

    All players are bunched into roughly one quarter of even this very small playing surface. 

    Consider how we expect play to unfold here. A throw-in possession can only be kicked a certain distance, and players are positioned to get wherever a kick could go. At that point, there could be a mark or free kick, or a spilled ground ball. In either case, players will already be running to maintain the bubble around that new situation.

    There’s only so far, and so fast, the ball can go, and players work to keep ahead of that action. At all times, the players’ reading of the situation, their structures, and their anticipation, define the active play area, and it’s always an area much smaller than the entire field.

    Fully using the entire field all at once means getting the ball truly to the outside of the active bubble, which eventually results in a released player running into an open goal. It’s difficult to engineer that, and if it happens, the empty grass ahead of the play works the same and plays the same, regardless of dimensions.

    Vertical and horizontal space

    Intuitively, though, one would think that 35 metres less distance goal to goal would result in far more scoring just because less kicks are required to get there.

    Quick-end to-end play does occasionally take place at North Sydney, if things break correctly:

    If a team can chain together long kicks either by winning a few contests or well executed leads, the shortened space is certainly there to exploit, and the game will have moments of very rapid transition from end to end.

    However, just as often, the narrow width and short length of the ground combine to crush the available horizontal space and congest the game. Here’s Collingwood exiting defensive 50 towards the very shallow wings and finding themselves immediately with little room to move:

    This is fairly normal coverage by Sydney on a wide Collingwood ball, but note how in this smaller ground, the Swans players pretty comfortably occupy space all the way to the corridor and a little beyond. Switching play and shifting defences will be relatively difficult with only 109 metres of width.

    The lack of width, and the temptation of that short vertical distance, should often allow teams to hedge more strongly towards defending down the line roost kicks.

    All in all, when it comes to a shrunken AFLW field, there doesn’t seem to be a particular reason to think that knocking 30 metres off the end-to-end distance is enough to make up for the relatively easy width coverage also allowed. That roaming bubble of footy action can move both directions, but when it overlaps with the edges of the ground, it can afford defending teams more capacity to congest ahead of the ball.

    This isn’t to say that a smaller ground can’t have high scores, rather it’s just to say that like any other ground, scoring levels are probably dependent  on tactics and team attributes rather than the amount of raw physical space.


    Around the Grounds

  • Week 6 2025

    Week 6 2025

    This Week In Football is a collection of some of the best in football currently outside the walls of AFL clubs or broadcasters. Each week a curated grab bag from regular contributors and special guests will provide insight into and beyond the game on subjects of their choosing. For more about our contributors, click here.

    Got an idea or want to contribute? Email thisweekinaustralianfootball at gmail dot com

    Huge shout out to Polly Porridge who designed the images and banners all across This week in football. Her design work is great. And if you are a Swans fan, or Sydney-curious, you should listen to the True Bloods Podcast.


    Before the bounce

    Welcome to the new (and hopefully) final home to This Week In Football. We’ve got a few new writers this week, and a brand new look.

    There’s also a subscribe button at the bottom, so if you want these missives each week straight to your inbox just drop your email in.


    Forever blowing bubbles

    Emlyn Breese – CreditToDuBois.com

    This is a summary of a longer piece I’ve written over at CreditToDuBois.

    Building on commentary in recent weeks, including Jasper’s piece last week, this week I’m going to take on the difficult task of dissecting bubbles.

    In the modern game teams generally defend space more than they defend players. Cody and Sean wrote about this back in 2020. In the broadest and simplest terms, a defence will be relatively happy if they can make close options risky, and long options easy to neutralise – the attacking team want to do the opposite.

    To maximise their chances, the attacking team needs to pose as many credible threats as possible. Even if you don’t use them on a given play, the more places a team feels like it needs to defend, the weaker its defence will be in any one spot. This is where the idea of the bubble comes in – it represents the area on field you can threaten. Initially you have a small bubble, through aggressive ball movement you can expand your bubble quicker than the defence can redeploy to defend it.

    I’m putting forward one (still very much in progress) method of looking at how well teams create credible threat, by looking at where the ball has tended to go.

    For this week at least, I’m limiting my scope just to intercept possessions at centre half back, which I’m defining as 40-60 metres from the defensive goal and within the width of the centre square.

    Let’s cut straight to the chase and dump a great big chart and then go through some through a few observations. I’ve chosen 6 seconds after the point of intercept as our reference point because that offered one of the better points of differentiation between teams. As you go further forward in time, the majority of all ball ends up in the forward sector (the vast majority of the field is in the forward sector at longer ranges, so this makes sense regardless of game style).

    A couple of quick things to consider:

    • Wedges are drawn at the 80th percentile of distance from the point of intercept in that sector – that is, for 4 in every 5 intercept chains the ball will be within the drawn areas 6 seconds after the point of intercept. Wedges are shaded darker based on the proportion of chains that are within that sector.
    • For every team other than Essendon (and St Kilda very marginally), the front sector is the most used
    • For every team other than Essendon, the front sector is the most used for their opponents.
    • Carlton and the Giants’ opponents aren’t going forward quickly – 80% of chains in the forward sector have travelled around 12 metres or less – contrast to Essendon, Richmond, and Sydney where that’s around the 50 metre mark.
    • St Kilda have one of the most balanced threat profiles, pretty well spread across front, lateral, and right 45s. They are also still in the back sector, but with the distance involved it looks like this is probably more from being behind the mark rather than actively moving the ball backwards.
    • Richmond favour long, lateral movement to the right.

    There’s a few important provisos here to keep in mind:

    • This is very much a work in progress, and it’s something I’ll likely keep iterating on through the season
    • The chart presented here doesn’t differentiate between intercept marks and non-marks
    • This is primarily about style, not effectiveness. I haven’t represented retention rates at all here.
    • We are still early in the season so sample sizes are low – things will be impacted by single game anomalies and which opponents a team has faced.

    As always hit me up with any feedback you have. Bluesky is probably the best place to reach me.


    Melbourne’s Inefficiency Inside 50 – System, Skill or Bad Luck?

    James Ives

    The 2025 version of the Melbourne Football Club is historically inefficient. They have the 5th worst Scores Per Inside 50 Rate of any team since 2012. If you remove the 2020 COVID season, they’re the worst.

    You might recall the shot map I released last week, where you could observe an abundance of white space around Melbourne’s hot spot. In reviewing their inside 50 kicks so far this season, you can see it’s not for a lack of trying. 

    Melbourne ranks:

    • 18th in Kicks Inside 50 Retention, and
    • 1st for Kicks Inside 50 resulting in a contest/stoppage
    • 1st for Offensive 1v1s 

    So where is it going wrong?

    I noticed a pattern in their first-quarter entries vs Essendon. Watch the video below and keep an eye on:

    1. Which forwards are sliding?
    2. Which forwards are hitting up at the ball?

    Let’s review these entries through a skill vs decision matrix, before overlaying the system component I touched on above. 

    • Skill: There were a few clear execution issues, but it’s hard to find fault in the long bombs to the hotspot.
    • Decision-making: Largely okay..  Maybe a missed opportunity to use Petracca (Langdon – example 8)
    • System: Melbourne’s ability to transition was exceptional. But upon entering the 50, every forward wanted to slide. These kicks to moving targets towards goal require elite skill and elite athletic profiles. That’s not Melbourne’s forward line. 

    This issue highlights the importance of an improved balance in Melbourne’s leading patterns. Forwards who are willing to stretch the ground vertically and horizontally to maximise the space inside 50 and know when to hit up with the intent to get used or to create a vacuum of space. This is fixable. The game against Fremantle this week presents itself as a last chance saloon to salvage their season. Melbourne’s efficiency inside 50 will go a long way in determining the outcome.


    What’s going on in the middle at Melbourne?

    Jack Turner – the Back Pocket

    Last week Cody accurately pointed out that Melbourne’s once lauded defence seems to be hanging on by a thread, even with Petty back there helping out May and McDonald. In that article he mentioned in passing Melbourne’s issues going forward, and this article builds on that, finding the KPIs that make Melbourne tick.

    In 2021, when Melbourne won their breakthrough premiership, they were ranked #3 for Clearances, #1 for Contested Possessions, #2 for Inside 50s, #2 for Scores per Inside 50 and #2 for Marks inside 50.

    They got it inside 50 more than almost anyone else, and they kept it in there until they scored. Much was talked about their all-star backline, but their attacking power was their secret asset.

    Their forwardline was already their weakness on paper, but through great positioning, good field kicking, and a great plan, they managed to spread the load – thanks to 11 players kicking double-digit goals – with medium-tall Bailey Fritsch and breakout small Kysiah Pickett kicking 99 goals between them.

    In 2025 – after five games – Melbourne currently sit #17 for Clearances, #12 for Contested Possessions, #15 for Inside 50s, #18 for Scores per Inside 50 and #18 for Marks per Inside 50. Their contested possessions, Inside 50s and Clearances were improved against Essendon on the weekend, but are still a dramatic decrease from their prime.

    These five stats, which identify and showcase the synchronisation between midfield and forwardline, are the ones Melbourne have to get right in order to be at their best. Let’s call them Melbourne’s KPIs.

    In 2018, when Melbourne surged into September and won their first final in twelve years – making their first preliminary final since their 2000 grand final loss – they were top six in the league for all of these KPIs. In 2021 they were top four in all five KPIs.

    Clayton Oliver is doing the lion’s share of clearance work at Melbourne, currently ranked sixth in the league for average clearances, but is the only Demon in the top 50.

    With a midfield mix that starts Max Gawn, Clayton Oliver, Christian Petracca, Jack Viney and Kysiah Pickett, you have to wonder how they aren’t able to at least extract the ball and get it into the underperforming forwardline (as was the issue in their doomed finals runs of 2023 and 2024).

    In 2024, there were serious issues around Melbourne’s midfield that we all recognised and understood, but with the full midfield mix back – and seemingly in full health – many expected 2025 to be a different story. 

    The loss of Alex Neal-Bullen and Angus Brayshaw can’t be underestimated, but Petracca pushing hard forward to create a target instead of focussing on winning the clearance seems akin an effort to solve world hunger by figuring out the logistics and transport before you figure out where the food is coming from. His frustration was on display for all to see against Geelong, and it was understandable.

    Whether the major issue is a poor gameplan, a lack of cohesion from a recently very disgruntled playing group, or the fact that these stars just aren’t the same players they used to be – Max Gawn is 33, Jack Viney is 30, and Petracca almost died last year – remains to be seen, but whatever it is, it needs to be fixed in a hurry or this is going to be a very long season for Melbourne fans.


    Scoring: so hot right now

    Mateo Szlapek-Sewillo, One Percenters

    Inspired by Australian sports trivia doyen Sir Swampthing’s recent tweet pointing out that Gather Round was the highest-scoring weekend of footy since Round 2, 2017, as well as persistent claims by pundits that the game is becoming ever faster and more open, I decided to dig into the numbers and divine some truths: is footy actually becoming higher-scoring? How is the composition of scoring changing? And what conclusions – at least tentative ones – might we draw about the future direction of travel?

    Some findings were as expected. Others, meanwhile, cut against the grain of expectation.

    The first and most banal conclusion is that, yes, we are in the midst of a clear upward trend in scoring.

    The chart below shows how many points sides have scored per game since 2017. Shortened quarters from 2020 are prorated for comparability throughout this piece. 

    Early in, 2025 is the highest-scoring season since 2017. That’s a reasonable sample size. At the same point last year, scores per game were within a point of the final season average.

    Let’s turn our attention to score sources – which holds the first finding I’d describe as mildly counterintuitive. Despite the frequency of claims that ball movement is the crucible of modern footy, chains beginning from stoppage wins have contributed an increasing share of scores in every season since 2021. 

    Just because an increasing share of scoring is coming from stoppage chains doesn’t mean that ball movement isn’t becoming more important. Getting the ball from the inside of the contest to the outside and then advancing up the field surely counts as “ball movement” just as much as affecting a turnover. That feeds into the next chart – where scoring chains originate.

    This may be the first indication of a true shift in how footy is being played.

    Ignore centre bounce. It’s a peripheral and, as Cody and Sean flagged in their piece last year, flukey source of scoring.

    The steady increase in scores from back-half chains is suggestive of teams placing a greater premium on the offensive (and defensive) value of moving the ball from back to front. It’s just a shame that publicly accessible data for this metric only dates back to 2021, immediately after the peak of Damien Hardwick’s famously forward-half intensive Richmond side. 

    The evidence for “ball movement” showing up in overall league scoring is somewhat ambivalent. The share of scores generated from turnovers is declining while scores from back-half chains are increasing. Surely, though – surely – the game is becoming more transition-oriented? After all, that’s what every pundit has been saying. Actually… the evidence for that is mixed. The chart below shows the average number of possession chains per side per AFLM game since 2017.

    Possession chains count how many times a side begins with the ball. Right now, despite 2025 being the highest-scoring season since 2017, it also features the fewest possession chains per game.

    Clearance numbers have remained very steady in the entire observation period. Instead, most of the observed decline in the number of possession chains is driven by declines in the number of intercept possessions per game. Again, a chart – and again, the 2020 caveat.

    I interpret this as robust although perhaps slightly counterintuitive evidence for the significance of “ball movement” in today’s game. Possession isn’t just a sword. It’s also a shield. The better you are at keeping the ball, the fewer opportunities the opposition will have to score.

    The average number of opportunities a side will have to generate a score is in decline. But the evidence suggests that sides are becoming much more adept at scoring when they win the ball – regardless of how they win it. 

    2025 marks at least the fifth straight year where the expected value of winning a clearance has increased. The expected value of turnover chains are a similarly strong upward trend. Teams are better at keeping the ball partly because the cost of losing it has probably never been higher.

    What about shot type? With thanks and credit to Andrew Whelan, creator and keeper of the extraordinary Wheelo Ratings website who personally supplied me with the shot type data:

    Since 2017, set shots vs general play have been very consistent, so it’ll be interesting to see whether the large shift between last season and this season persists.

    A related trivia question: one side has clearly scored more of its points from general play shots than set shots to date in 2025 (another is about 50/50). A shout-out in the next edition of the One Percenters newsletter to anyone who correctly guesses the identity of that side.

    Assuming these numbers a) are accurate; and b) hold, I think the most salient question to ask is how are teams becoming so much better at generating scores? Here’s where I agree with the common wisdom: players today are more skilled, attacking schemes are more mature, and (this bit is slightly more speculative) the defensive schemes to nullify them perhaps haven’t quite advanced at the same pace.

    However – this is where it gets properly impressionistic – I wonder if we’re seeing the evidence of something deeper: a shift in the overarching philosophy of how we view and play the game. The evidence is there in a more qualitative way, if you look.

    The best sides are lauded for their aptitude and speed with the ball. Winning “the contest” has never been more weakly correlated with winning actual games. It even feels like the value of defenders is increasingly measured, both in analytical spaces and also the digital pub surrounds of Bigfooty et al, by how much they contribute in possession.
    There have been higher-scoring seasons and eras. But I’d argue they were functions of either a tactically immature game (prior to the early 2000s) or super-dominant sides which overwhelmed the competition by stacking tactical and talent advantages (see: Alastair Clarkson’s Hawthorn).

    This feels slightly different, almost as though the fruit is both riper and more evenly distributed. In that regard, our current direction of travel reminds me just a little of the attacking revolution that swept through elite club soccer around the end of the 2000s – and hasn’t really abated since. Long may it continue.


    Who hasn’t lost a defensive one-on-one contest this year?

    Sean Lawson

    One of the more enigmatic statistics Champion Data and the AFL publish is the contested defensive one-on-one, with the catchy acronym of CDOOO. A one-on-one contest is defined like this:

    One-On-One Contest: A 50-50 contest that occurs after a kick, and involves only two players – a target player and a defender. Each player must have a reasonable chance to win the ball in order for a one-on-one to be recorded. Winning and losing percentages refer to how often a player wins the ball or concedes a possession to his opponent. A neutral result is recorded when the ball is spoiled or results in a stoppage.

    CDOOOs are those that occur in the back half for a given player, and they do have limitations under this definition. Most obviously, weaker team defences can concede more solo contests, which even if won well, may not be what the team wants.

    And that requirement for a reasonably even chance in the contest also matters. If you as a defender can’t get into an even-money position and are simply fully beaten, you may not even be tabbed with the contest and loss, but can’t really be said to have done your defensive job.

    Regardless, though, they contest stats have become a nice way to try to evaluate the defensive prowess of individuals who are often pretty difficult to measure and track.

    A quick look at last year’s leaders shows that it mostly passes the eye test – Harris Andrews and Sam collins facing a lot of these one v one battles with aplomb, losing very few. Less accomplished defenders spreading upwards into higher loss rates, some well organised cover defences like the Swans and Saints facing relatively few isolated 50:50s at all.

    It’s a quirky number, though. The requirement for the contest to be approximately 50:50 and isolated keeps the numbers relatively low, which makes assessing things tricky early in the year. 

    Currently, Darcy Moore has faced the most 1v1 contests this season, 20. Poor Harry Edwards sits second and looks beleaguered, having lost almost half of his contests.

    Moore, interestingly, is seeing contests at double the rate per game he faced last year, which suggests his role may be worth watching as part of the Pies’ more winning approach so far this season. Leaving him more exposed may be enabling more aggressive positioning elsewhere, relying on his individual talent to cover some extra risk-taking

    And Moore has delivered, with only the lost one contest. When did he lose this? Contested losses are difficult to pin down in the AFL app’s generally well tagged statistics-based highlights, because if a player is beaten, they usually don’t record anything taggable (unless they lose by giving a free kick).

    What we can say is Darcy Moore’s only contested one-on-one loss so far this year came against the Bulldogs. I suspect it may have been whichever of the six Sam Darcy contested marks was deemed something approximating a 50:50 contest:

    That brings us to the question here. Which players in 2025 are yet to lose a one on once defensive contest and how long can they last?

    In 2024, for comparison, the most contests without a loss was 8 by Jarrod Berry. It’s hard to sustain a fully clean sheet.

    Here’s everyone who’s seen at least 5 one v one contests without losing one:

    PlayerTeamCDOOOs without loss
    Jacob WeiteringCarlton9
    Sam De KoningGeelong7
    Lachie JonesPort Adelaide6
    Jeremy HoweCollingwood6
    Max MichalanneyAdelaide6
    Brady HoughWest Coast6
    Brodie GrundySydney5

    De Koning and Grundy are playing a different game to everyone else, both being players largely defending their opposite rucks and being notable for beating them on the deck. That may keep them in good stead against the rest of these defenders who could at any point find themselves out of position, pinned to a mismatch or needing to concede a professional free kick.

    Who holds out the longest? Which new contenders will emerge? We may check back later in the year.


    Kicking with width

    Cody Atkinson

    The ABC yesterday published an article about handballing – no need to read it…if you insist…but one thing that intrigued was that in recent years the share of handballs to kicks had actually plateaued a little. Not a great deal, but the mountain may have crested a decade or so ago.

    That raises the natural question around the other part of the equation – that of the kicking game.

    Last year’s Brisbane Lions kicked it more than any other side proportionally. This year it’s another recent premier that is leading the way.

    Brisbane’s ability to shift defence by foot has grabbed the attention of opposition teams – as well as some that have begun to ape the trend. For Geelong this kick heavy style is nothing new – it’s how they have been moving the ball over in recent years.

    The Suns represent the antithesis of this tactical shift. Their games have fewer kicks than any other teams, and a lower kick to handball ratio to boot. The Suns not only mark the ball less than any other side but they also allow fewer marks than the rest of the competition.

    That unspeakable ABC article above included one interesting item at the start – the longest goalscoring handball chain of the year from Port Adelaide. That shouldn’t come as a huge shock – the Power is firmly in the Hardwick school of handball heavy play (despite being strong for marks).

    The longest kick chain that has ended in a goal this year? Well, that would be the Dons – another normally kick-resistant side.

    *The counter broke near the end. I’m sorry.

    Of particular note is the Dons use of width and patience in moving the ball. Even as the commentators egg the Dons via telepathy to use the handball the Dons mostly hold firm. With 13 kicks to just one handball, and a couple of fairly large shifts across the ground, the Dons slide the Hawks around with ease.

    Geelong in their longest kick-exclusive scoring chains show a similar steadfastness in their speed, while utilising the whole width of the ground. Shannon Neale’s goal to open the fourth quarter against Melbourne saw the Cats go the full width of the (narrow) Kardinia Park twice.

    Making sides defend the full field is critical to finding space and mismatches in the modern game. The handball – and actual footspeed – isn’t the only way to do so.


    Are the 2020s becoming the decade of the old bloke?

    Rudi Edsall

    “Age is just a number” has long been the sentiment generally only offered by the most punishing exercise guy that you still follow because you went to high school together.

    But watching Patrick Dangerfield steamroll Adelaide last weekend at an age that would normally have commentators talking about him like an archaeologist would a well-preserved dinosaur fossil made me wonder: is 30 becoming the new 28 in the AFL?

    30 has always been perceived as the footy cliff; the Great Dividing Range where a player goes from In Their Prime to Wizened Old Sage (or worse: Over The Hill), but the best players now seem capable of squeezing every last drop of juice out of their bodies – and perhaps more pertinently, minds – to a greater degree than ever before.

    Clearly it’s likely to be due to advances in professionalism and conditioning, as well as the players’ own personalities – it’s hard to imagine Scott Pendlebury spending his offseason mainlining Bintang and mushy shakes in South East Asia for example.

    Arguably as a big a factor, however, has been a willingness on the part of both player and coaching staff to adapt. Dangerfield is the perfect example: With Tom Hawkins and Gary Rohan both moving on, the Cats needed another presence inside 50 and the decision wouldn’t have been made on a whim.

    The Cats would have reasoned that Dangerfield has the explosive speed and power, overhead ability, ruthlessness and contested marking to be a genuinely difficult matchup inside 50, rather than a player who had an attribute mismatch against their direct opponent that characterises most midfielders who push forward to impact the scoreboard.

    It’s easy to be cynical about such a switch – moving a great one-on-one player forward of the ball isn’t exactly rocket science – but the fact that Dangerfield started the first game of the season inside 50 rather than at the centre bounce was a flex that both club and player are on board with the ploy.
    It’s not just Dangerfield who is redefining himself in the post-30 landscape either – a torn Keidean Coleman ACL last year famously led to Dayne Zorko moving to half back at 35 years old and making the All-Australian team in a flag year.

    Other 30+ players have had career seasons and moments in the 2020s – Tom Hawkins was a 4x All-Australian and won a Coleman and a flag after 30, Isaac Smith was a Norm Smith Medallist at 33, Scott Pendlebury calmly orchestrated a Collingwood flag in the fourth quarter of the hottest grand final of recent memory as a 35 year old, and Steele Sidebottom stretched every millimetre of his 32 year old soft tissues to kick the sealer in that same game from platform 1 at Jolimont station.

    Incidentally, Pendlebury is now 37 and seems to be cruising towards Boomer Harvey’s all time games record – and who knows how many more games he’d have had to his name if player and coaching staff could have found a middle ground at the end of 2016?


    Around the Grounds

    Here’s some other good looks from elsewhere this week.